Financial crises and the politics of macroeconomic adjustments /

Financial crises and the politics of macroeconomic adjustments /

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This book explains why governments respond differently to macroeconomic problems and why necessary reforms are sometimes delayed until a serious financial crisis erupts.

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Bibliographic Details
Online Access:Electronic book from EBSCO
Main Author: Walter, Stefanie (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published:New York : Cambridge University Press, [2013]
Series:Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Subjects:
Economic stabilization > Political aspects.
Financial crises.
Electronic books.
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments
  • Series
  • Dedication
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Figures
  • Tables
  • Preface
  • ONE Introduction
  • 1.1 Why Macroeconomic Adjustment Becomes Necessary
  • 1.2 How and When Do Policymakers Adjust? Existing Explanations
  • 1.2.1 Choosing between Internal and External ­Adjustment
  • 1.2.2 The Timing of Macroeconomic Adjustment
  • 1.2.3 Open Questions
  • 1.3 The Argument
  • 1.3.1 Explaining Voters' Vulnerabilities to Internal and External Adjustment
  • 1.3.2 Explaining Government Choices on Type and Timing of Macroeconomic Adjustment
  • 1.4 The Plan of the Book
  • TWO Individual Vulnerability to Macroeconomic Adjustment
  • 2.1 The Distributional Effects of External ­Adjustment
  • 2.1.1 Direct Effects of External Adjustment on Voters
  • 2.1.1.1 Relative Price Effects: Purchasing Power Concerns
  • 2.1.1.2 The Financial Side: Personal Balance Sheet ­Concerns
  • 2.1.2 Indirect Effects of External Adjustment on Voters
  • 2.1.2.1 Employment­-Specific Effects: Competitiveness and Financial Concerns Revisited
  • 2.1.2.2 General Economic Effects of External ­Adjustment
  • 2.1.3 The Net Effect of External Adjustment on Voters
  • 2.2 The Distributional Effects of Internal Adjustment
  • 2.2.1 Direct Effects of Internal Adjustment on Voters
  • 2.2.1.1 Monetary Tightening: Personal Balance Sheet Concerns
  • 2.2.1.2 Contractionary Fiscal Policy: Direct Effects on Voters
  • 2.2.1.3 Structural Reform: Direct Effects on ­Voters
  • 2.2.2 Indirect Effects of Internal Adjustment on Voters
  • 2.2.2.1 The Employment­-Specific Effect of Internal Adjustment
  • 2.2.2.2 General Economic Effects of Internal Adjustment
  • 2.2.3 The Net Effect of Internal Adjustment on Voters
  • 2.3 The Vulnerability Profile and Voters' Preferences on External and Internal Adjustment
  • 2.4 Conclusion.
  • THREE Direct Vulnerabilities to Adjustment
  • 3.1 Voter Evaluations of Economic Policy Outcomes during ­the 2008-2010 Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Research Design
  • 3.1.1 Research Strategy
  • 3.1.2 The Dependent Variable: Economic Repercussions of the Crisis
  • 3.1.3 Independent Variables: Voter Vulnerabilities and Macroeconomic Adjustment Strategies
  • 3.1.3.1 Direct Vulnerability to External Adjustment
  • 3.1.3.2 Direct Vulnerability to Internal ­Adjustment
  • 3.1.4 Control Variables and Method
  • 3.2 How Exchange Rate Changes Affect Voters Vulnerable to External Adjustment
  • 3.3 How Internal Adjustment Affects Voters' Evaluations of ­the Severity of Crisis Repercussions
  • 3.4 Conclusion
  • FOUR Indirect Vulnerabilities to Adjustment
  • 4.1 How Firms Assess Their Vulnerabilities to Exchange-Rate and Monetary Policy
  • 4.1.1 The Data
  • 4.1.2 Measuring Firm­-Specific Vulnerabilities to Exchange­-Rate and Monetary Policy
  • 4.1.3 Firm­-Level and Country­-Level Variation in Vulnerabilities
  • 4.2 The Determinants of Firms' Vulnerabilities to External Adjustment
  • 4.2.1 Operationalization
  • 4.2.2 Method
  • 4.2.3 Results
  • 4.3 The Determinants of Firms' Vulnerabilities to Internal Adjustment
  • 4.3.1 Operationalization and Method
  • 4.3.2 Results
  • 4.4 Firms' Overall Vulnerabilities to Macroeconomic Adjustment
  • 4.4.1 Operationalization and Method
  • 4.4.2 Results
  • 4.5 Conclusion
  • FIVE Interests, Elections, and Policymakers' Incentives to Adjust
  • 5.1 To Adjust or Not to Adjust? And If So, When and How? The Government's Decision Problem
  • 5.2 The Voter's Viewpoint: Policy Outcomes and Vote ­Choice
  • 5.3 How the Electorate's Vulnerability Profile Affects Policymakers' Choices about the Speed and Type of Adjustment
  • 5.3.1 The Timing of Adjustment
  • 5.3.2 The Choice of Adjustment Strategies
  • 5.4 Conclusion.
  • SIX Adjustment in the Asian Financial Crisis
  • 6.1 Thailand: Delayed Adjustment and Exchange­-Rate Crash
  • 6.1.1 Thailand's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis
  • 6.1.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in ­Thailand
  • 6.1.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment
  • 6.1.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment
  • 6.1.2.3 The Vulnerability Profile of the Thai ­Electorate
  • 6.1.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy Choices in Thailand
  • 6.1.4 Discussion
  • 6.2 Taiwan: Speedy External ­Adjustment
  • 6.2.1 Taiwan's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis
  • 6.2.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in ­Taiwan
  • 6.2.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment
  • 6.2.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment
  • 6.2.2.3 The Electorate's Vulnerability Profile in Taiwan
  • 6.2.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy ­Choices in Taiwan
  • 6.2.4 Discussion
  • 6.3 Hong Kong: Immediate Internal Adjustment
  • 6.3.1 Hong Kong's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis
  • 6.3.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in Hong Kong
  • 6.3.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment
  • 6.3.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment
  • 6.3.2.3 The Vulnerability Profile of Hong Kong's Electorate
  • 6.3.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy Choices ­in Hong Kong
  • 6.3.4 Discussion
  • 6.4 South Korea: Delayed Adjustment and Exchange­-Rate Crash
  • 6.4.1 South Korea's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis
  • 6.4.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in South Korea
  • 6.4.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment
  • 6.4.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment
  • 6.4.2.3 The Vulnerability Profile of the South Korean Electorate
  • 6.4.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy Choices in South Korea
  • 6.4.4 ­Discussion
  • 6.5 Conclusion
  • 6.6 Appendix: List of Interviewees.
  • SEVEN Adjustment in Eastern Europe during the Global Financial Crisis
  • 7.1 Eastern European Responses to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis
  • 7.1.1 Internal Adjustment: The Baltics and Bulgaria
  • 7.1.2 Mixed Adjustment Strategies: Hungary and Romania
  • 7.1.3 External Adjustment: Czech Republic and Poland
  • 7.1.4 Conclusion: Variation in Adjustment Strategies in Eastern Europe
  • 7.2 Vulnerabilities to Internal and External Adjustment across Eastern Europe
  • 7.2.1 Direct and Indirect Vulnerabilities to External Adjustment
  • 7.2.2 Direct and Indirect Vulnerabilities to Internal Adjustment
  • 7.2.3 Vulnerability Profiles in Eastern ­Europe
  • 7.3 The Distributional Politics of Adjustment to the Global Financial Crisis
  • 7.3.1 Strong Support for Painful Reform: The Baltics and ­Bulgaria
  • 7.3.2 A Mixed Bag: Hungary and Romania
  • 7.3.3 Uncontroversial External Adjustment: The Czech Republic and Poland
  • 7.4 Conclusion
  • EIGHT Conclusions
  • 8.1 Agenda for Future Research
  • 8.2 Policy Implications
  • References
  • Index
  • Series.

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